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The Uneasy Case for California’s 
“Care Custodian” Statute 
David Horton 
INTRODUCTION 
In about a decade, California will be “the grayest state in the nation.”1  
More than six million residents—one-seventh of the population—will be 
over age sixty-five.2  This demographic sea change, unprecedented 
longevity,3 and the growing number of elders who opt to remain in their 
own homes as they age has “push[ed] demand for home care services, such 
as bathing and dressing, meal preparation and driving clients on errands.”4  
Home caregivers—who earn an average of $20,283 per year5 and are 
exempt from federal minimum wage and overtime laws6—will be tending 
to a generation that has amassed seventy percent of the country’s wealth,7 
and passes about a trillion dollars by inheritance each year.8 
 
  Lecturer in Residence, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall) School of Law.  J.D., 
UCLA School of Law, 2004; B.A., Carleton College, 1997. 
 1 Steve Geissinger, Baby Boomer Issues Looming, OAKLAND TRIB., Oct. 2, 2006, available at 
2006 WLNR 17028019 (quoting California Assemblywoman Patty Berg). 
 2 See Jennifer Coleman, Report: California Population Will Grow Older, More Diverse, S.J. 
MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 23, 2005, at B5, available at 2005 WLNR 18879683; Press Release, Governor 
Schwarzenegger Announces the California Nurse Education Initiative, Apr. 13, 2005, available at 
http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/2046 (last visited June 23, 2008). 
 3 See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Longevity and Health Characteristics, at 3-1, available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/1/pop/p23-190/p23190-g.pdf (last visited June 23, 2008) (noting that  “life  
expectancy  at  birth  ha[s]  reached  a  record  high”). 
 4 Barbara Correa, Home Sweet Home: Elderly Parents, Children Need Early Talk About Care, 
DAILY NEWS (L.A.), April 3, 2008, at B1, available at 2008 WLNR 6391885; see also Sandra Block, 
Elder Care Shifting From Nursing Homes, U.S.A. TODAY, June 25, 2007, at 1B, available at 2007 
WLNR 11917438 (noting that the percentage of people over seventy-five in care facilities fell more 
than  three  percent  from  1985  to  2004).    Even  the  “frailest  elderly  remain  in  their  own  homes.”    Michael  
Vitez, National Conference on Aging Delivers Wake-up Call to Boomers, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 
March 11, 2007, at A4, available at 2007 WLNR 4598239. 
 5 See California Employment Development Department, Home Health Aid Fact Sheet, available 
at http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/HealthCare/HCC-Home-Health-Aides.pdf (last visited June 23, 2008). 
 6 See Long Island Care, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S.Ct. 2339, 2345 (2007) (holding that the Fair Labor 
Standards  Act  does  not  apply  to  a  “domestic  worker  who  provides  ‘companionship  services’  to  elderly  
and  infirm  men  and  women”). 
 7 See Marilyn Gardner, Love and Money and Fraud, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 9, 2006, at 
14, available at 2006 WLNR 13703280. 
 8 See John Leland, Breaking the Silence, N.Y. TIMES,  Mar.  18,  2008,  at  H1  (calling  this  “[t]he  
largest   intergenerational   transfer   of   wealth   in   American   history”).      Even   after   estate   taxes,   experts  
predict that beneficiaries will receive between $24 trillion and $65.3 trillion between 1998 and 2052.  
See John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why The $41 Trillion Wealth Transfer Estimate is Still Valid: 
A Review of Challenges and Questions, 7 J. GIFT PLAN. 11, 49 (2003). 
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At the intersection of these trends stands a novel California statute.  
Probate Code section 21350 presumptively voids testamentary gifts to “a 
care custodian of a dependent adult.”9  No other state bars devises to 
caregivers.10  Yet Section 21350 defines “care custodian” and “dependent 
adult” broadly.  A “care custodian” includes any non-relative “providing 
health services or social services to an elder or dependent adult.”11  A 
“dependent adult” is anyone over sixty-four “whose physical or mental 
abilities have diminished because of age.”12 
Thus, on its face, the statute suggests that a beneficiary can forfeit a 
legacy by “simply cooking for an elderly person, driving a house-bound 
individual to the bank or doctor, or going shopping for them.”13  To avoid 
this perverse result, California courts uniformly held that Section 21350 
governed “professional ‘care custodians’”14 and not “well-meaning 
friend[s].”15  Recently, however, in Bernard v. Foley,16 the California 
Supreme Court rejected these views and held that the statute’s text contains 
neither a “professional or occupational limitation” nor a “preexisting 
personal friendship exception.”17  Despite the California Supreme Court’s 
“customary and proper reticence in encouraging legislative action,”18 the 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Bernard placed the onus 
on the legislature to clarify the statute.19 
The legislature tasked the California Law Revision Commission with 
“considering the overall effectiveness of the current statutory scheme.”20  
On May 14, 2008, the Commission proposed redefining (1) “care 
custodian” as “a person who provides health or social services to a 
dependent adult for compensation, as a profession or occupation” and (2) 
“dependent adult” as a person who is eligible for appointment of a 
conservator.21 
 
 9 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(6) (West 2007). 
 10 See Jessica Garrison, Caregivers’   Inheritance Is Blocked, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, at 3, 
available at 2006 WLNR 14500607. 
 11 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(c) (West 2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17(y) 
(West 2007). 
 12 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(c) (West 2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.23(a) 
(West 2007). 
 13 In re Conservatorship of Estate of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 711–12 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 14 Id. at 713. 
 15 In re Conservatorship of McDowell, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 10, 22 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 16 139 P.3d 1196 (Cal. 2006). 
 17 Id. at 1204–05. 
 18 Bernard, 139 P.3d at 1210 (George, C.J., concurring). 
 19 See id. at 1207–08  (“In  the  event,  however,  we  have  mistaken  the  Legislature’s  intention,  that  
body  may  readily  correct  our  error.”);;  id.  at  1210  (George,  C.J.,  concurring)  (“[T]he  Legislature would 
do   well   to   consider   modifying   or   augmenting   the   relevant   provisions”);;   id. at 1214 (Corrigan, J., 
dissenting)  (“[T]here  is  no  reason  to  believe  the  Legislature  intended  such  an  outcome.”). 
 20 See ASSEMB. B. 2034, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006), available at http:// 
www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_2001-2050/ab_2034_bill_20060907_chaptered.pdf. 
 21 See Cal.   Law   Revision   Comm’n,   Memorandum   2008-21, Study L-622, Donative Transfer 
Restrictions, May 14, 2008, at 19–20, available at http://clrc.ca.gov/pub/2008/MM08-21.pdf. 
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These amendments would limit the statute and thus vastly improve it.  
Yet despite the Law Revision Commission’s license to re-imagine the law, 
it accepts the premise that byzantine rules must regulate devises to 
caregivers.  I respectfully challenge that assumption.  I highlight four points 
that I believe have not received their due in the debate over how to reform 
Section 21350.  The first is that California courts uniquely respect 
testamentary autonomy.  In other states, scholars complain that “courts are 
as committed to ensuring that testators devise their estates in accordance 
with prevailing normative views as they are to effectuating testamentary 
intent.”22  This is not so in California.  The “care custodian” provision—
which substitutes a categorical legislative determination for a testator’s 
express wishes—deviates from this tradition.  Second, the legislature 
enacted Section 21350 to create a presumption of wrongdoing when 
lawyers receive devises in estate plans they had authored.  However, 
California common law already recognized that exact presumption.  Thus, 
the statute changed little about a lawyer’s right to inherit from a client.  Yet 
when with little fanfare the legislature extended the statute to caregivers, it 
fundamentally altered a caregiver’s ability to accept a legacy from a 
patient.  At the same time, the good reasons to preclude lawyers from 
profiting from their own draftsmanship do not apply to caregivers. 
Third, the Law Revision Commission offers three rationales for 
retaining the “care custodian” clause: (1) caregivers have the opportunity to 
exert undue influence; (2) elders depend on caregivers; and (3) gifts to 
caregivers seem inherently “undue.”23  To be sure, caregivers enjoy 
dominion over impaired elders.  Yet caregivers provide services that, even 
if remunerated, are selfless and socially beneficial.  As a normative matter, 
it is unclear why gifts to caregivers should be suspect.  Fourth, an inflexible 
rule is not a good fit for the deeply personal question of a testator’s intent.  
The undue influence doctrine covers the same terrain at less risk of 
disregarding autonomy or penalizing kindness.24 
This essay contains two parts.  Part I sketches the history of the “care 
custodian” provision and the cases that have struggled to interpret it.  Part 
II examines the Law Revision Commission’s tentative recommendations 
and concludes that, although they would enhance the “care custodian” 
provision, they would not preclude it from causing dubious results. 
 
 22 Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236 (1996). 
 23 See Cal.  Law  Revision  Comm’n, supra note 21, at 7–8. 
 24 California’s  potent  Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act also provides for 
treble  damages,   recovery  for  pain  and  suffering,  and  attorneys’  fees   in  elder  abuse  actions.    See CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 15600–15675 (West 2007). 
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I.  TESTAMENTARY AUTONOMY IN CALIFORNIA, SECTION 21350, 
AND THE “CARE CUSTODIAN” STATUTE 
“[V]irtually the entire law of wills derives from the premise that an 
owner is entitled to dispose of his property as he pleases in death as in 
life.”25  Thus, courts often make grandiose statements about testamentary 
autonomy.  For example, “the right to testamentary disposition of one’s 
property is a fundamental one which reaches back to the early common 
law,”26 “does not depend upon its judicious use,”27 and includes the 
prerogative “to make an unjust or an unreasonable or even a cruel will.”28 
Yet all states regulate testamentary gifts.  The most common reasons 
courts refuse to enforce an otherwise valid will are the doctrines of 
incapacity and undue influence.29  Incapacity requires proof that at the time 
the testator signed the will, she could not understand (1) the meaning of the 
testamentary act, (2) the extent of her property, and (3) her important 
relationships.30  Undue influence is more complex.  Indeed, all wills stem 
from influence.31  Thus, courts hold that influence is “undue” only when it 
is “brought to bear directly on the testamentary act, sufficient to overcome 
the testator’s free will, amounting in effect to coercion destroying the 
testator’s free agency.”32  Cases usually hinge on whether a contestant has 
raised a presumption of undue influence.  To do so, a contestant must prove 
that (1) the testator and the defendant had a confidential relationship, (2) 
the defendant actively participated in the will’s preparation or execution, 
and (3) the defendant unduly profited from the will.33  If a contestant 
establishes these elements, the burden shifts to the defendant to show an 
absence of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence.34 
In most jurisdictions, scholars complain that courts use these rules to 
impose hegemonic norms.35  In re Kaufmann’s Will36 is an oft-cited 
 
 25 John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 
(1975).  I will use the terms, “testator”  and  “will,”  even  though  this  essay  pertains  equally  to  trusts. 
 26 In re Fritschi’s  Estate,  384  P.2d  656,  659  (Cal  1963). 
 27 In re McDevitt’s  Estate,  30  P.  101,  106 (Cal. 1892). 
 28 In re Martin’s  Estate,  151  P.  138,  141  (Cal.  1915). 
 29 Fraud can also invalidate a will, although it appears less often in cases.  See Estate of Newhall, 
214  P.  231,  235  (Cal.  1923)  (“[F]alse  representations . . . have been held to constitute fraud if it can be 
shown that they were designed to and did deceive the testator into making a will different in its terms 
from  that  which  he  would  have  made  had  he  not  been  misled.”). 
 30 See In re Conservatorship of Bookasta, 265 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 31 See, e.g., Ray D. Madoff, Unmaking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 575 (1997). 
 32 Rice v. Clark, 47 P.3d 300, 304 (Cal. 2002). 
 33 See Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560, 563 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 34 See id.  A contestant does not need to establish the presumption to win.  See David v. 
Hermann,  28  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  622,  631  (Ct.  App.  2005)  (finding  the  trial  court  properly  “did  not  rely  on  the  
presumption, but rather applied the general principle of undue influence to a review of all the 
evidence”). 
 35 Madoff, supra note 31, at 576  (“[T]he  undue  influence  doctrine  denies  freedom  of  testation  for  
people who deviate from judicially imposed testamentary norms—in particular, the norm that people 
should  provide  for  their  families”);;  see also Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual 
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example of this tendency.  In that case, Robert Kaufmann, the scion of a 
wealthy jeweler, left his estate to his lover and business partner, Walter 
Weiss, instead of his brothers, Joel and Aron.  Robert enclosed a letter with 
his will that articulated his profound feelings for Walter.37  Nevertheless, a 
New York appellate court concluded that the will stemmed from Walter’s 
undue influence.  The court expressed doubt that Robert could have chosen 
to bequeath his fortune to an “unrelated” person.38  It then dismissed the 
letter as “utterly unreal, highly exaggerated and pitched to a state of fervor 
and ecstasy.”39  Cases such as Kaufmann have prompted some 
commentators to declare that incapacity and undue influence serve, “not to 
protect freedom of testation, but rather to protect the testator’s family 
against disinheritance.”40 
California jurisprudence has been far more protective of idiosyncrasy.  
A mid-century study found that in contests—generally brought by unhappy 
heirs-at-law—juries invalidated legacies seventy-seven percent of the 
time.41  Yet appellate courts reversed a whopping fifty percent of these 
verdicts for insufficient evidence.42  Rather than insulating juries from 
reviewing courts, in 1988 the legislature eliminated the right to a jury trial 
for will contests.43  Thus, the state has a tradition of taking testamentary 
freedom seriously. 
Three doctrinal nuances illustrate this point.  First, in capacity cases, 
California courts have insisted that a contestant prove that the testator was 
of “unsound mind” at the very moment she executed the will.44  They thus 
have rejected incapacity claims, even when faced with strong evidence of 
testator impairment before and after the signing.  In Estate of Mann,45 for 
 
Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 225,   267   (1981)   (“[T]estamentary   plans   will   continue   to   be   unduly  
jeopardized so long as courts regard homosexuality as a special case”);;  Leslie,  supra note 22, at 236; 
Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 210 (2001) 
(asserting   that   courts   “manipulate   mental   capacity   doctrines   such   as   ‘undue   influence’ . . . to reach 
results  more  in  accord  with  the  family  paradigm”). 
 36 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1964). 
 37 The letter left no doubt that Robert was in love with Walter: 
Walter gave me the courage to start something which slowly but eventually permitted me 
to supply for myself everything my life had heretofore lacked: an outlet for my long-latent 
but strong creative ability in painting . . . a balanced, healthy sex life which before had 
been spotty, furtive and destructive; an ability to reorientate myself to actual life and to 
face it calmly and realistically. All of this adds up to Peace of Mind—and what a delight, 
what a relief after so many wasted, dark, groping, fumbling immature years to be reborn 
and become adult! 
Id. at 671. 
 38 Indeed, the court  telegraphs  its  holding  in  the  opinion’s  second  sentence.    See id. at  665  (“The  
contestants are the distributes of  and  the  proponent  is  unrelated  to  the  decedent.”). 
 39 Id. at 674. 
 40 Madoff, supra note 31, at 619. 
 41 See Note, Will Contests on Trial, 6 STAN. L. REV. 91, 92 (1953). 
 42 See id. at 92 n.4. 
 43 See CAL. PROB. CODE §   8252(b)   (West   2007)   (“The   court   shall   try   and   determine   any  
contested  issue  of  fact  that  affects  the  validity  of  the  will.”). 
 44 In re Lingenfelter’s  Estate,  241  P.2d  990,  996  (Cal.  1952). 
 45 229 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1986). 
HORTON 12/22/2008 1:15 PM 
52 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 12:47 
example, the testator had dementia and was placed under a conservatorship.  
She was “not eating or caring for herself properly; . . .she was unclean and 
smelled like urine,” and would often “forget[ ] dates, the time of year, and 
what she was doing.”46 Nevertheless, the court of appeal reversed a jury 
determination of incapacity because the only witnesses to the will’s 
execution “all testified decedent was aware of what she was doing at the 
time.”47 
Second, in undue influence cases, most states deem a beneficiary to 
have “actively participated” in the will’s creation if she “directed the 
testator to the drafting lawyer, made the appointment for the testator, or 
even merely knew of the contents of the will.”48  However in California, 
“the mere fact of the beneficiary procuring an attorney to prepare the will is 
not sufficient.”49  For instance, in Estate of Fritschi,50 the California 
Supreme Court held that the testator’s mistress did not “actively 
participate” in a will that favored her to the detriment of the testator’s 
children even though she attended discussions about the estate plan, located 
a witness for the will, gave the testator a pen, and remained just outside the 
room. 
Third, most jurisdictions do not look beyond whether a beneficiary is 
related to a testator when deciding whether she would “unduly profit”: 
A ‘natural’ disposition is one which provides for a testator’s heirs at law.  As one 
court succinctly put it: ‘[T]he natural object of a will maker’s bounty is one 
related to him/her by consanguinity.’  The status of the beneficiary, rather than 
the quality of the beneficiary’s relationship to the testator, determines what is a 
natural disposition for purposes of the undue influence analysis.  In determining 
status, courts have generally relied on the intestacy statutes as a model for 
naturalness.51 
California takes the opposite approach.  For example, in Estate of 
Sarabia52—a case that provides a vivid counterpoint to Kaufmann—
Guillermo Sarabia, an opera singer, left his estate to his agent and 
companion, Leonard Gibbs.53  Sarabia’s brother filed a contest, arguing that 
Gibbs’s profit was “undue” since he was not related to Sarabia and would 
take nothing without the will.54  The court of appeal disagreed, reasoning 
that a fact-finder must place itself in a testator’s shoes to determine whether 
profit is “undue”: 
 
 46 Id. at 227–28. 
 47 Id. at 230. 
 48 Madoff, supra note 31, at 587. 
 49 See Estate of Bould, 287 P.2d 8, 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (collecting cases). 
 50 384 P.2d 656, 661 (Cal. 1963). 
 51 Madoff, supra note 31, at 590–91 (quoting In re Estate of Maheras, 897 P.2d 268, 273 (Okla. 
1995)). 
 52 270 Cal. Rptr. 560 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 53 Id. at 561. 
 54 See id. at 563. 
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For the trier of fact to decide what influence was ‘undue’ clearly entails a 
qualitative assessment of the relationship between the decedent and the 
beneficiary. . ..  The trier of fact derives from the evidence introduced an 
appreciation of the respective relative standings of the beneficiary and the 
contestant to the decedent in order that the trier of fact can determine which party 
would be the more obvious object of the decedent’s testamentary disposition.55 
Thus, because Sarabia was less close to his brother than to Gibbs, the court 
held that Gibbs’s profit was not “undue.”56 
Yet, as protective as California courts were of testamentary autonomy, 
they regarded one class of bequests as suspect—those to the drafting 
attorney.  Such devises automatically gave rise to a presumption of undue 
influence.57  This bright-line rule made sense; by definition, the drafting 
attorney enjoys a confidential relationship with the testator and plays an 
active role in the will’s preparation and execution.  Although the drafting 
attorney might not unduly profit from the will, lawyers are fiduciaries for 
their clients, and thus “proof that the benefit to an attorney was ‘undue’ is 
not required to trigger a presumption of undue influence.”58  Similarly, 
courts held lawyers to a higher standard for rebutting the presumption, 
requiring “clear and satisfactory evidence.”59 
In sum, freedom of testation was not just lofty rhetoric in California; 
rather, it was woven into the fabric of the common law.  Events in the early 
1990’s would test these principles. 
A. Section 21350 
In 1992, the Los Angeles Times published a searing exposé of James 
D. Gunderson, an Orange County lawyer who had written himself into 
many of his elderly clients’ estate plans.60  From his law offices inside 
Leisure World—a gated retirement community so large it became its own 
municipality61—Gunderson routinely prepared wills that lavished bequests 
upon himself.62  These gifts included $3.5 million from a 98-year-old blind 
 
 55 Id. at 564. 
 56 See id. at 565–66. 
 57 See Estate of Lind, 257 Cal. Rptr. 853, 856 (Ct. App. 1989); see also Estate of Auen, 35 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 557, 562–63  (Ct.  App.  1994)  (rejecting  attorney’s  claim  that  the  traditional  three-element test 
for the presumption of undue influence applies).  Similarly, Probate Code section 6112 creates a 
presumption   of   “duress,   menace,   fraud,   or   undue   influence”   for   testamentary   gifts   to   a   necessary  
subscribing witness.  Section 6112 actually liberalized this rule; previously, such gifts were absolutely 
void  to  the  extent  they  exceeded  the  witness’s  intestate  share.    See CAL. PROB. CODE § 51, repealed by 
Stats. 1983, c. 842, § 18, operative Jan. 1, 1985. 
 58 Auen, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562. 
 59 In re Phillipi’s   Estate,   172   P.2d   377,   378   (Cal.   Ct.   App.   1946).      Conversely,   an   interested  
witness—like a defendant in a common law undue influence action—must refute the presumption of 
invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence.  See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6112 (West 2007). 
 60 See Davan Maharaj, Lawyer Inherited Millions in Stock, Cash From Clients, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
22, 1992, at A1, available at 1992 WLNR 4030163. 
 61 See California Retirement Community to Become City of Seniors, Mar. 3, 1999, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9903/03/leisure.world.01 (last visited June 30, 2008). 
 62 See Davan Maharaj, Leisure World Lawyer Heir to Clients' Millions, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 
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and deaf man63 and $250,000 from a woman whom Gunderson had 
described in court papers as “unable to pay her bills or manage her 
assets.”64  Gunderson also peppered his instruments with clauses that 
shifted tax liability to other beneficiaries65 and insulated his “inheritance” 
from contests.66 
The articles sparked outrage and threatened to eviscerate the standing 
of the probate bar and bench.67  The California Legislature responded 
swiftly.  Less than a year after the stories broke, it passed a bill—A.B. 21—
to “unambiguously prohibit the most patently offensive actions of 
Gunderson.”68  A.B. 21 created Probate Code section 21350, which 
invalidates transfers to “disqualified person[s]”: the drafting attorney, their 
family, their law partners, and their employees.69  New Section 21351 
carved out narrow exceptions.  The first is for the transferor’s relatives and 
 
1992, at A1, available at 1992 WLNR 4029997. 
 63 See An Maharaj, 4 Clients Whose Estates Enriched James D. Gunderson: Merrill A. Miller, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at A43, available at 1992 WLNR 4029597 [hereinafter, Maharaj, Merrill A. 
Miller]. 
 64 See Davan Maharaj, 4 Clients Whose Estates Enriched James D. Gunderson: Emerald Mary 
Sully, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at A43, available at 1992 WLNR 4027557; see also Davan Maharaj, 
4 Clients Whose Estates Enriched James D. Gunderson: Margaret Hough, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, 
at A43, available at 1992 WLNR 4029045 (describing a conveyance of real property that Gunderson 
recorded in his favor a year after the owner had died); Davan Maharaj, 4 Clients Whose Estates 
Enriched James D. Gunderson: Martin L. Fisher, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at A43, available at 1992 
WLNR 4027466 (describing Gunderson receiving ninety-nine  percent  of  a  client’s  estate).  The story 
soon went national.  See Judge Removes Attorney as Trustee, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at A6, 
available at 1992 WLNR 149893; Attorney Investigated for Estate Dealings, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 14, 
1992, at A12, available at 1992 WLNR 1087089; Lawyer   Stripped   of   Control   of   Elderly   Clients’  
Money, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 14, 1992, at A8, available at 1992 WLNR 4370156; California 
Lawyer Queried on Wills, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14, 1992, at 6, available at 1992 WLNR 1852585. 
 65 See Maharaj, Merrill A. Miller, supra note 63. 
 66 See Davan Maharaj, Bill  Targets  “No  Contest”  Estate  Ploy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1992, at B1, 
available at 1992 WLNR 4009546. 
 67 See Editorial, Laws Must Be Toughened to Protect the Elderly from Exploitation, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 25, 1992, at B6, available at 1992   WLNR   4036978   (“38   other   states   have   adopted   tougher  
guidelines set by the American Bar Assn. prohibiting lawyers, under threat of disbarment, from 
preparing  trusts  or  wills   in  which   they  are  beneficiaries.  California  should  do  the  same.”);;  George  C.  
Balderas, Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at B11, available at 1992 WLNR 4017373 
(describing  a  talk  radio  show  which  featured  “a  string of callers all relating negative experiences with 
their  attorneys.”);;  Robert  R.  Shively,  Letter  to  the  Editor,  L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at B11, available 
at 1992   WLNR   4018065   (“[H]ow   did   Mr.   Gunderson   persuade   Superior   Court   probate   judges   to  
approve such  wills  for  probate?”).    High-level figures tried to control the damage.  The president of the 
State  Bar  of  California  “stress[ed]  how  important  it  is  for  any  person  who  questions  the  actions  of  an  
attorney  to  report  this  behavior.”    Harvey  I.  Saferstein, Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1992, at 
B6, available at 1992 WLNR 4065722.  The Supervising Judge of the Orange County Probate 
Department  called  for  “a  comprehensive  review  of  the  Probate  Code,  the  Probate  Court  Rules  and  the  
Attorney Rules of Ethics.”      Tully   H.   Seymor,   Living Trusts, Probate Court Duties in Supervising 
Estates Reviewed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1992, at B6, available at 1992 WLNR 4071077. 
 68 ASSEMB. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, B. ANALYSIS., A.B. 21, 1993–1994 Leg., Reg. Sess.(Cal. 
1993)   (“AB  21  was   introduced   in   response   to . . . the activities of a probate attorney, Mr. James D. 
Gunderson,   from   Orange   County”),   available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/asm/ab_0001-
0050/ab_21_cfa_930208_101917_asm_comm. 
 69 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(1)–(3) (West 2007); id. § 21350.5.  The bill also made 
“[a]ny  person  who  has  a  fiduciary  relationship  with  the  transferor . . . who transcribes the instrument or 
causes  it  to  be  transcribed”  a  “disqualified  person.”    Id. § 21350(a)(4). 
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spouse or domestic partner.70  Another requires a neutral lawyer to attest in 
a “certificate of independent review” that the gift was voluntary.71  A third 
permits the lawyer to prove that “the transfer was not the product of fraud, 
menace, duress, or undue influence” (1) by clear and convincing evidence, 
(2) not based solely on the testimony of any “disqualified person.”72  If the 
lawyer fails, she must pay the contestant’s costs and attorneys’ fees.73 
Some lawmakers, including Governor Wilson, and members of the 
press saw the statute as a potent weapon against financial elder abuse.74  
Yet rather than blazing a trail, the statute largely codified the common law.  
As noted, California courts already assumed that devises to drafting 
attorneys flowed from undue influence75 and required “clear and 
satisfactory evidence” to overcome this presumption.76  To be sure, Section 
21350 also prohibited drafting attorneys from carrying their burden with 
their own testimony and saddled them with paying a successful contestant’s 
attorneys’ fees and costs.77  Ironically, though, its next biggest change was 
probably to create exceptions to what had been an inflexible presumption 
of invalidity.78  Thus, perceptions notwithstanding, Section 21350 did little 
to change the state of the law. 
B. The “Care Custodian” Provision 
In 1997, the state’s booming in-home care industry led the Trusts and 
Estates Section of the Bar to sponsor a novel amendment to the statute.  
The Trusts and Estates Section was concerned about the sway that 
“practical nurse[s]” and others “hired to provide in-home care” have over 
“demented elder[s].”79  The legislature responded with A.B. 1172.  Noting 
that “practical nurses or other caregivers hired to provide in-home care. . . 
are often working alone and in a position to take advantage of the person 
they are caring for,”80 the legislature added a “care custodian of a 
 
 70 See id. § 21351(a). 
 71 See id. § 21351(b). 
 72 See id. § 21351(d).    As  originally  enacted,  the  statute  excluded  testimony  from  all  “disqualified  
persons.”    See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(d) (2001), amended by Stats. 2002, c. 412 (S.B.1575), § 1. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See Davan Maharaj, Wilson Signs Bill to Protect Estates of the Elderly, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 
1993, at B1, available at 1993  WLNR  4201678  (quoting  Wilson  as  declaring  that  section  21350  “gives  
the state sufficient ammunition against these legal vultures who are preying on the vulnerable members 
of  our  society.”) 
 75 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 76 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 77 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 78 See supra note 70. 
 79 California Law Revision Commission, Study L-622, Mar. 10, 2008, at 2, available at 
http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/2008/MM08-13.pdf (last visited June 30, 2008) (quoting Letter from Don 
Green and Marc B. Hankin to David Long, State Bar of California Director of Research, Oct. 16, 1996) 
(“A   ‘practical   nurse’   (or   other   caregiver   hired   to   provide   in-home care for an aging progressive 
dementia victim) might find it too easy to take advantage of the dependence and close working 
relationship to induce the demented elder  to  make  testamentary  gifts”). 
 80 S. RULES COMM., B. ANALYSIS, ASSEMB. B. 1172, 1997–1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug.8, 
1997), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_1151-1200/ab_1172_cfa_19970828_ 
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dependent adult”   to   Section 21350’s litany of “disqualified person[s].”81  
Thus, the statute now reads: 
[N]o provision, or provisions, of any instrument shall be valid to make any 
donative transfer to any of the following: (1) The person who drafted the 
instrument. (2) A person who is related by blood or marriage to, is a domestic 
partner of, is a cohabitant with, or is an employee of, the person who drafted the 
instrument. (3) Any partner or shareholder of any law partnership or law 
corporation in which the person described in paragraph (1) has an ownership 
interest, and any employee of that law partnership or law corporation. . .. (6) A 
care custodian of a dependent adult who is the transferor.82 
The statute defines “dependent adult” and “care custodian” broadly.  
Even though the Trusts and Estates Section described the protected class as 
“dementia victim[s],”83 the term “dependent adult” includes anyone over 
sixty-four “whose physical or mental abilities have diminished because of 
age.”84  Likewise, despite the legislature’s preoccupation with nurses 
“hired [for] in-home care,”85 the term “care custodian” includes a catalog 
of specific entities and individuals, plus a sweeping catch-all: “[a]ny other. 
. . person providing health services or social services to elders or dependent 
adults.”86  This liberal scope would soon cause mischief. 
 
193607_sen_floor.html. 
 81 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(6) (West 2007). 
 82 Id. § 21350(a). 
 83 California Law Revision Commission, Study L-622, supra note 79. 
 84 See CAL. PROB. CODE §  21350(c)  (West  2007)  (“[T]he  term  ‘dependent  adult’  has  the  meaning 
as set forth in Section 15610.23 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and also includes those persons 
who . . .  are  older  than  age  64”);;  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.23(a) (West 2007). 
 85 S. RULES COMM., B. ANALYSIS, ASSEMB. B. 1172, 1997–1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug.  8, 
1997), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_1151-1200/ab_1172_cfa_19970828_ 
193607_sen_floor.html. 
 86 See CAL. PROB. CODE §  21350(c)  (West  2007)  (“The  term  ‘care  custodian’  has  the  meaning  as  
set forth in Section   15610.17   of   the  Welfare   and   Institutions  Code.”);;  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 
15610.17(y) (West 2007).  In full, Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.17 states: 
‘Care  custodian’  means  an  administrator  or  an  employee  of  any  of  the  following  public  or 
private facilities or agencies, or persons providing care or services for elders or dependent 
adults, including members of the support staff and maintenance staff: [¶] (a) Twenty-four-
hour health facilities, as defined in Sections 1250, 1250.2, and 1250.3 of the Health and 
Safety Code. [¶] (b) Clinics. [¶] (c) Home health agencies. [¶] (d) Agencies providing 
publicly funded in-home supportive services, nutrition services, or other home and 
community-based support services. [¶] (e) Adult day health care centers and adult day care. 
[¶] (f) Secondary schools that serve 18- to 22-year-old dependent adults and postsecondary 
educational institutions that serve dependent adults or elders. [¶] (g) Independent living 
centers. [¶] (h) Camps. [¶] (i) Alzheimer's Disease day care resource centers. [¶] (j) 
Community care facilities, as defined in Section 1502 of the Health and Safety Code, and 
residential care facilities for the elderly, as defined in Section 1569.2 of the Health and 
Safety Code. [¶] (k) Respite care facilities. [¶] (l) Foster homes. [¶] (m) Vocational 
rehabilitation facilities and work activity centers. [¶] (n) Designated area agencies on aging. 
[¶] (o) Regional centers for persons with developmental disabilities. [¶] (p) State 
Department of Social Services and State Department of Health Services licensing divisions. 
[¶]  (q)  County  welfare  departments.  [¶]  (r)  Offices  of  patients’  rights  advocates  and  clients’  
rights advocates, including attorneys. [¶] (s) The office of the long-term care ombudsman. 
[¶] (t) Offices of public conservators, public guardians, and court investigators. [¶] (u) Any 
protection or advocacy agency or entity that is designated by the Governor to fulfill the 
requirements and assurances of the following: [¶] (1) The federal Developmental 
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C. Cases Interpreting the “Care Custodian” Provision 
The “care custodian” statute first reared its head in Estate of Shinkle.87  
Laverne Shinkle was seventy-seven years old and in poor health.  Her 
closest relative was a cousin she had not seen for forty years.88  After she 
fractured a hip at home, she recovered at South Valley Hospital, a skilled 
nursing facility.  There she met C.J. Thompson, the volunteer long-term 
care ombudsman.89  Despite rules prohibiting ombudsmen from befriending 
patients, Thompson helped Shinkle run errands, pay her bills, and balance 
her checkbook.  Even when he was sent to another facility and she returned 
home, he visited her.  When she said she wanted to leave her property to 
him, he arranged for her to consult with an estate planner.90 
The trial court struck down the devise to Thompson and the courts of 
appeal affirmed.  The court of appeal explained that the definition of “care 
custodian” expressly includes a “long-term care ombudsman.”91  In 
response, Thompson asserted that his transfer and Shinkle’s discharge from 
the facility meant that he was not her ombudsman at the time she executed 
the trust.92  He cast himself as “only an ‘informal friend,’ providing 
‘friendly aid to an at-home individual.’”93  The court was not persuaded.  It 
held that Thompson’s ombudsman status helped him meet Shinkle, earn her 
confidence, and learn intimate details about her.94  It then refused to disturb 
the trial court’s finding that Thompson had not disproved undue influence 
under Section 21351.95 
Two years later, In re Conservatorship of Estate of Davidson96 
wrestled with whether a good friend provided “health services or social 
services” and thus was a disqualified “care custodian.”  In the 1960’s, 
Dolores Davidson and her husband met Stephen Gungl and his partner.  
 
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, contained in Chapter 144 
(commencing with Section 15001) of Title 42 of the United States Code, for protection and 
advocacy of the rights of persons with developmental disabilities. [¶] (2) The Protection 
and Advocacy for the Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986, as amended, contained in 
Chapter 114 (commencing with Section 10801) of Title 42 of the United States Code, for 
the protection and advocacy of the rights of persons with mental illness. [¶] (v) Humane 
societies and animal control agencies. [¶] (w) Fire departments. [¶] (x) Offices of 
environmental health and building code enforcement. [¶] (y) Any other protective, public, 
sectarian, mental health, or private assistance or advocacy agency or person providing 
health services or social services to elders or dependent adults. 
 87 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 88 Id. at 50. 
 89 Ombudsmen are trained, state-certified   volunteers   who   “serve   as   advocates   for   residents   in  
long-term-care facilities.”    Id. at 44. 
 90 See id. at 46. 
 91 See id. at  53  (explaining  that  “care  custodian”  includes  “‘an  employee  of . . . [t]he office of the 
long-term  care  ombudsman’”)  (quoting  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17(s)). 
 92 See id. at 54. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See id. (“But for the ombudsman program, Thompson would not have met Shinkle, would not 
have  had  access  to  her  financial  and  personal  information,  and  would  not  have  gained  her  trust.”). 
 95 See id. at 56. 
 96 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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The two couples forged a close bond, and spent birthdays, anniversaries, 
and holidays together.97  About ten years later, Davidson’s husband died.  
Gungl visited often, helped out around the house, and, when Davidson 
could no longer drive, he chauffeured her.  Davidson called Gungl and his 
partner “her boys.”98  In 1990, she executed a will leaving her estate to her 
cousin, Elaine Morken. 
In 1992, Davidson began to decline.  Gungl and his partner cooked, 
gardened, and banked for Davidson, bought her groceries and medications, 
and drove her to the doctor.99  In 1995, Gungl, who was revising his and his 
mother’s estate plan, recommended that Davidson place her assets in a 
trust.  In 1996, Davidson signed an instrument that left $5,000 to Morken 
and the balance of her estate to Gungl.  In 1998, Morken and her 
husband—who only saw Davidson a few times a year—learned about the 
new estate plan.100  They complained to the public guardian about Gungl 
and asked the court to appoint a conservator for Davidson.  In the 
conservatorship proceeding, Gungl submitted an accounting that revealed 
he had written twenty-four checks from Davidson to himself that he had 
labeled “salary” or wages.”101  When Davidson died in 2000, Morkin’s 
husband102 challenged the trust under Section 21350. 
The trial court determined that Section 21350 did not apply to Gungl.  
The court of appeal affirmed on three independent grounds.  First, the court 
held that Gungl’s sporadic acts of kindness were “unsophisticated care and 
attention,” not “health services or social services.”103  The court reasoned 
that a contrary result would penalize good Samaritans: 
[V]irtually any individual providing personal care to a dependent adult, no matter 
how intimately and personally connected they might be, would be disqualified 
from receiving a gift, bequest, devise, or other donative transfer from the 
dependent adult under a trust or will unless they were related to the dependent by 
blood or marriage.  Appellant’s interpretation of ‘care custodian’ is so broad as to 
include not only the provision of health care or social services, but such acts as 
simply cooking for an elderly person, driving a house-bound individual to the 
bank or doctor, or going shopping for them.104 
Second, the court examined the history of the “care custodian”  
provision and found that the legislature meant to bar gifts only to 
professional caregivers.105  The court admitted that Davidson had 
 
 97 See id. at 705. 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. at 706, 712. 
 100 See id. at 707.  Davidson was wary that the Morkens intended to place her in a nursing home 
and seize control of her financial affairs.  See id. 
 101 See id. at 716.  The court in the conservatorship proceeding surcharged Gungl for $7,782.70 of 
unaccounted   expenses.      Although   it   called   Gungl’s   “actions . . . sloppy, disorganized, and often 
unwise,”  it  refused  to  find  that  Gungl  acted  in  bad  faith.    See id. at 716 n.12. 
 102 Elaine Morken died shortly before Davidson.  See id. at 705. 
 103 Id. at 713. 
 104 Id. at 711–12. 
 105 See id. at 713–14. 
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compensated Gungl for his services.106  Nevertheless, it credited Gungl’s 
testimony that he simply used this money to reimburse himself for out-of-
pocket expenses.107  Third, the court determined that the statute did not 
apply to people like Gungl, whose “provision of care developed naturally 
from a preexisting genuinely personal relationship.”108  Finally, even 
assuming that Gungl was a “care custodian,” the court held that he had 
carried his burden under Section 21351 of proving that “Davidson’s 
decision to leave the bulk of her estate to [him] rather than the Morkens 
was based on a long-standing affectionate relationship between the two, 
and not undue influence.” 109 
Similarly, In re Conservatorship of McDowell110 held that Section 
21350 did not apply to a “well-meaning friend.”  In February, 2000, 
Kathryn McDowell, a retiree, met Ann Netcharu.111  Netcharu bought 
McDowell coffee and food.  When McDowell returned from a stint in the 
hospital that summer, Netcharu washed her and changed her diapers.112  In 
August, the court appointed a public guardian as McDowell’s 
conservator.113  In September, 2000, Netcharu took McDowell to three 
different lawyers before finding one willing to draft a will.  McDowell left 
half of her estate to Netcharu.  Before she signed the will, she said she 
relied on Netcharu “for medical care, home maintenance, food and 
clothing,” and wanted to leave her money “because [she] was assisting 
her.”114  The public guardian sought to nullify that will and create a new 
one leaving McDowell’s estate to charity.115  The trial court granted the 
petition and held that Section 21350 voided the gift to Netcharu.116 
The court of appeal reversed, acknowledging that McDowell had 
known Netcharu for a mere six months when she executed her estate 
 
 106 Id. at 716. 
 107 Id. at 717 & n.13. 
 108 Id. at 716.  The court articulated a three-factor test to determine whether an individual is a 
“care  custodian”:  “(1)  the  length  of  time  the  individuals  had a personal relationship before assuming the 
roles of caregiver and recipient; (2) the closeness and authenticity of the personal relationship; and (3) 
whether  any  money  was  paid  for  the  provision  of  care.”    Id. 
 109 Id. at 719.  Oddly, the court then held that   Morken’s   husband   had   failed   to   establish   a  
presumption of common law undue influence, reasoning that Gungl neither actively participated in the 
execution of the trust nor unduly benefited.  See id. at 721–22.  The court had already opined that Gungl 
had met his burden under section 21351 of disproving undue influence by clear and convincing 
evidence—a more rigorous showing than that required to rebut the conventional presumption of undue 
influence.    Thus,  the  issue  of  whether  Morken’s  husband  had  established a presumption of common law 
undue influence should have been superfluous. 
 110 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 10 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 111 See id. at 16. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See id. at 12. 
 114 Id. at 17. 
 115 See id. at 13.  This procedure, where a conservator seeks court permission to take an action on 
behalf of the conservatee, is   called   a   “petition   for   substituted   judgment.”      See CAL. PROB. CODE § 
2580(a) (West 2007). 
 116 See McDowell, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 13. 
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plan.117  Nevertheless, relying heavily on Davidson, it reasoned that 
Netcharu did not provide “health services or social services” because she 
had never engaged in care-giving in any other capacity: 
[T]here is no evidence [Netcharu] generally offered care services to the elderly 
and dependent adult population as a paid or volunteer provider.  Nor is there 
evidence that [her] relationship with Ms. McDowell grew out of a preexisting 
professional or occupational connection or that [Netcharu] and Ms. McDowell 
had a quid pro quo arrangement, under which Ms. McDowell reasonably 
expected [Netcharu] to provide care, and [Netcharu] reasonably expected 
something in return.  Rather, the court found that [Netcharu] was a well-meaning 
friend.118 
Thus, the court of appeal remanded the case for the lower court to consider 
the conservator’s other claims: whether the doctrines of incapacity and 
undue influence vitiated the will.119 
But two years later, in Bernard v. Foley,120 the California Supreme 
Court saw the statute through a different prism than Shinkle, Davidson, or 
McDowell.  James Foley and his girlfriend, Ann Erman, were Carmel 
Bosco’s “longtime personal friends.”121  In 1991, Bosco created a trust that 
left her sister, Ann Cassell, a third of her estate, and made other relatives 
residual beneficiaries.122  Over the next decade, Bosco amended her trust 
three times, naming different trustees, but preserving her original 
dispositional scheme.123 
In 2001, Bosco learned that she had cancer.124  On June 12, 2001, she 
amended her trust again, nominating Foley as successor trustee.  This was 
the first time she had mentioned either Foley or Erman in her estate plan.  
In July, at Erman’s “repeated urging,” Bosco moved in with her and 
Foley.125  Bosco could not care for herself, and so Erman and Foley 
shopped for her, cooked for her, managed her finances, cleaned her room, 
did her laundry, bathed her, changed her diapers, and administered an array 
of medications.126  In August and September of 2001, Bosco amended her 
trust twice more, giving Foley additional power as trustee and removing 
devises to other relatives.127  Finally, on September 25, she signed the 
seventh amendment, which left “the ‘lion’s share’” of her property to Foley 
and Erman.128  She died three days later.129 
 
 117 See id. at 22. 
 118 Id. at 21–22. 
 119 See id. at 26. 
 120 139 P.3d 1196 (Cal. 2006). 
 121 Id.  at  1197.    Erman,  in  fact,  had  once  been  married  to  Bosco’s  nephew.    See id. at 1198 n.2. 
 122 See id. at 1210 (George, C.J., concurring). 
 123 See id. 
 124 See id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 1202. 
 127 See id. at 1211. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See id. at 1210–11. 
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Justice Werdegar, joined by Justices Baxter and Chin, held that Foley 
and Erman were “care custodians.”  The majority strictly adhered to the 
text of Section 21350.  It reasoned that the statute incorporates “[a]ny. . . 
person” tendering “health services or social services” into the definition of 
the term “care custodian.”130  At the same time, the majority noted that the 
statute says nothing about the person’s vocation or history with the 
dependent adult.131  The majority therefore overruled Shinkle, Davidson, 
and McDowell to the extent they recognized “a professional or 
occupational limitation” or “a preexisting personal friendship exception.”132  
The majority noted that this “may in some instances result in inequity,” but 
declined to second-guess the legislature.133  Finally, the majority 
emphasized that Foley and Erman were not beneficiaries who only later 
became “care custodians”; instead, they had never appeared in Bosco’s 
testamentary instruments until after they had begun caring for her.134  
Accordingly, because Foley and Erman had provided “substantial, ongoing 
health services,” the majority voided the bequests to them.135 
Chief Justice George concurred, reasoning that the case was a shining 
example of why the legislature wisely refused to delineate between paid 
and unpaid caregivers.  The Chief Justice noted that even amateur 
caregivers enjoy dominion over their charges.136  Yet the Chief Justice also 
conceded that the statute could produce “counterintuitive” results.137  He 
opined that less cause for skepticism exists when a dependent adult confers 
a gift on a friend who “provide[s] substantial, ongoing health services. . . 
for an extended period.”138  He therefore called on the legislature to add a 
temporal element to the “care custodian” provision.139 
Justice Corrigan, joined by Justices Kennard and Moreno, dissented.  
Justice Corrigan took issue with the majority’s construction of the statute, 
noting that the definition of “care custodian” contains twenty-four 
examples of entities and institutions.  Given that backdrop, Justice Corrigan 
 
 130 Id. at 1202 (majority opinion). 
 131 See id. at 1204. 
 132 Id. at 1202.  Bizarrely, the majority later claimed to be overruling Shinkle, Davidson, and 
McDowell “to   the   extent   they   interpreted   section   21350   as   allowing   for   a   preexisting   personal  
friendship exception,”  while   saying  nothing  about  Davidson and McDowell’s  discrete professional or 
occupational exception.  Id. at 1209 n.14.  In light of the rest of the opinion, this must be an inadvertent 
omission. 
 133 See id. at   1208   (“[W]e need not strain to discern (because we are not free to impose a 
universally desirable result in terms of public policy.”)  (internal quotations omitted). 
 134 See id. at  1209  (“Foley  and  Erman  became  beneficiaries  of  the  Trust  only  pursuant  to  changes  
decedent made in her will while she was living with them and they were providing her with care 
services.”). 
 135 Id. at 1197, 1202. 
 136 See id. at 1211 (George, C.J., concurring). 
 137 Id. at 1212. 
 138 Id. at 1211. 
 139 See id. at   1212   (proposing   that   a   bequest   created   “within   one   year   following   the 
commencement of a new nonprofessional caregiving relationship or within one year preceding the death 
of  the  dependent  adult,  will  be  subject  to  the  presumption  of  undue  influence”). 
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explained, the catch-all phrase “[a]ny other. . . person providing health 
services or social services” must be understood as encompassing others 
“who provide[ ] care or assistance through some formal relationship, rather 
than on a private friendship or familial basis.”140  Justice Corrigan also 
doubted that lawmakers intended to disincentivize kindness and generosity: 
In terms of public policy, it seems unwise to penalize Good Samaritans by 
making them less eligible to receive the gratitude of those they help, the kinder 
they have been.  As the majority opinion points out, Foley and Erman welcomed 
the decedent into their own home and performed a variety of challenging, 
personal, and distasteful tasks to ease the burdens of her final illness.  The law 
should not cast a jaundiced eye on those who provide such care to family or 
friends, and there is no reason to believe the Legislature intended such an 
outcome.141 
Finally, In re Estate of Odian142 followed Bernard and determined that 
a “paid live-in companion” was a “care custodian.”  In 2000, Helen Odian, 
an eighty-four year-old who lived alone, hired Catharina Vulovic to shop, 
cook, perform chores, and drive.  Odian eventually asked Vulovic to live 
with her in return for $500.00 per week.143  They spent holidays together.  
Odian became close to Vulovic’s children.  She told friends that “she 
would not have lived as long” without Vulovic and “that she wanted to 
leave her estate to [her].”144  In 2001, however, when a financial advisor 
recommended that Odian prepare a trust, Odian explained that she wanted 
to name charities as beneficiaries.145  The day before Odian’s appointment 
to sign the trust, the financial advisor received a fax, written by Vulovic, 
that Odian wanted to draft her own will.  Odian then signed a form estate 
plan—in which Vulovic had filled in all the blanks—that left her estate to 
Vulovic.  The financial advisor was unable to contact Odian afterwards.  
An investigator from adult protective services and a psychologist met with 
Odian and found her unable to recall details about her life, including 
Vulovic’s name.146 
The trial court voided the gifts on several grounds: incapacity, undue 
influence, and the “care custodian” statute.147  The court of appeal affirmed.  
The court reasoned that Bernard doomed Vulovic’s claims that the statute 
did not apply because of her friendship with Odian or because she “was 
arguably not a professional caregiver.”148  The court then addressed the 
thornier issue of whether Vulovic had provided the kind of services that 
makes one a “care custodian.”  Vulovic argued that Davidson remained 
 
 140 Id. at 1213 (Corrigan, J., dissenting). 
 141 Id. at 1214 (internal citations omitted). 
 142 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 392 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 143 Id. at 393. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 393. 
 146 Id. at 395. 
 147 Id. at 392. 
 148 See id. at 398–99. 
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good law to the extent it suggested that “services such as cooking, cleaning, 
shopping and driving do not amount to health or social services of a care 
custodian.”149  Although the court agreed that this aspect of Davidson had 
survived Bernard,150 it construed Davidson’s holding differently: 
Davidson did not actually hold that services such as those are not social services 
within the meaning of the statute.  In Davidson, the court found, primarily, that 
the beneficiary of the estate was not a care custodian because his role as the 
decedent’s caregiver arose naturally from his long-term friendship with her and 
not from his employment as a caregiver.  Secondarily, the court questioned 
whether services such as cooking, gardening, running errands, providing 
transportation, grocery shopping and providing assistance with banking could be 
equated with social services.151 
Likewise, Odian noted that Bernard mentioned that “substantial and 
ongoing health services” make one a “care custodian” but did not discuss 
“social services.”152  Calling it “a question of first impression,” Odian held 
that “an expansive interpretation of ‘social services’.  .   . best promotes the 
Legislature’s objective of protecting vulnerable dependent adults from 
exploitation.”153  Because Vulovic was a “paid live-in caregiver” who “took 
care of [Odian’s] home” and “cooked, cleaned, and drove” Odian, the court 
determined that she was a “care custodian.” 154 
D. The Current State of the Law 
The most glaring problem with the definition of “care custodian” is 
that it is virtually boundless: “[a]ny [other]. . .  person[] providing health 
services or social services to elders or dependent adults.”155  Even though 
Bernard held that “health services” must be “substantial” and “ongoing,” it 
conjured these limiting principles out of thin air156—an odd move in light 
 
 149 Id. at 399 (internal quotations omitted). 
 150 See id. at   399   n.7   (“In   Bernard, the court disapproved Davidson only to the extent that 
Davidson held   that   section  21350(a)   allows   for   a   ‘preexisting   personal   friendship   exception.’      Thus,  
Davidson remains  citable  authority  with  respect  to  its  discussion  of  the  social  services  issue.”)  (internal 
citations omitted). 
 151 Id. at 399–400 (internal citations omitted). 
 152 Id. at  400.     (“In  Bernard,  the  court  did  not  discuss   the  meaning  of  the  term  ‘social  services,’  
and it did not hold, as appellant contends, that only the provision of substantial ongoing health services 
renders a caregiver a care custodian . . . .”). 
 153 Id. at 401. 
 154 Id.  The court also held that Vulovic had failed to rebut the presumption under section 21351, 
as she attacked the evidence offered against her, rather than offered affirmative evidence of her own.  
See id. at 402. 
 155 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(c) (West 2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17(y) 
(West   2007).      Similarly,   the   term   “dependent   adult”   includes   any   person   over   sixty-four who has 
“diminished  because  of  age.”    CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(c) (West 2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 
15610.23(a) (West 2007).  Of course, one would be hard-pressed to find anyone over sixty-four who did 
not fit this bill. 
 156 Compare Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1197, 1202 (Cal. 2006) with id. at 1214 n.3 
(Corrigan,  J.,  dissenting)  (“The  majority  imports  the  terms  substantial and ongoing care into the statute 
without supporting citation of statutory language  or  legislative  history.”). 
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of the majority’s textualist approach to statutory interpretation.157  
Moreover, although Bernard took pains to point out that it might reach a 
different result if “friends who were [already] testamentary beneficiaries of 
a testator subsequently became care custodians”158—a situation in which 
the caregiver would have little incentive to exploit the elder—the statute 
does not address the issue.  If Bernard could not create a preexisting 
friendship exception in the face of legislative silence, then it cannot 
defensibly create a preexisting beneficiary exception in the face of 
legislative silence.  Thus, as long as the California Supreme Court gives the 
statutory language talismanic significance, one cannot minister to a senior 
without running the risk of becoming a “care custodian.”159 
The meaning of “social services” is equally, if not more, elusive.  
Although Odian asserts that Davidson merely “questioned” whether duties 
“such as cooking, gardening, running errands, providing transportation, 
grocery shopping and. . . banking” could be “social services,”160 Odian is 
incorrect.  Davidson squarely held that “errands, chores, and household 
tasks. . . cannot be equated with the provision of ‘health services and social 
services.’”161  Odian’s self-proclaimed “expansive interpretation of ‘social 
services’” better accords with Bernard’s reluctance to read exclusions into 
the statute.162  Yet, if “social services” means nothing more than 
“socializing” or “helping,”  then  Section 21350 sweeps within its ambit any 
bequest from an elder to a friend.  This cannot be the legislature’s intent.  
One can rectify Odian with Davidson because Odian, unlike Davidson, 
featured a salaried, live-in caregiver.  Volovic shared almost every waking 
moment with Odian, and thus had more of an opportunity to control her.163  
Such distinctions, however, are born of common sense, not anything in the 
definition of “care custodian.”  Thus, the statute desperately needs reform. 
 
 157 See id. at 1204 (majority opinion) (rejecting  Foley  and  Erman’s  arguments  “[i]n   light  of   the  
statutory  language”). 
 158 Id. at 1209 (emphasis added). 
 159 The Bernard majority   dismissed   fairness   concerns   because   the   “certificate   of   independent  
review”  in  “section  21351  provides  a  clear  pathway  to  avoiding  section  21350.”    Id. at 1208.  Yet after 
practicing at an estate planning firm and researching both reported and unreported cases for this article, 
I   have  never  heard  of   anyone   actually  using   the   “certificate  of   independent   review”  procedure.  The 
consensus among estate planning attorneys was that few testators were willing to pay for an 
independent attorney to undertake the searching investigation necessary to rule out caretaker 
overreaching.  In addition, the specter of malpractice liability made them reluctant to participate in the 
certification process. 
 160 Odian, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 399–400. 
 161 Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1197, 1202 (Cal. 2006). 
 162 Odian, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 402. 
 163 Compare id., 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390 with In re Conservatorship of Estate of Davidson, 6 Cal. 
Rptr.  3d  702,  712  (Ct.  App.  2003)  (“during  the  time  period  most  relevant   to   this  case,  Davidson was 
still  essentially  maintaining  her  independence”). 
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II.  THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION’S TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Law Revision Commission recently voted to limit the definition 
of “care custodian” to paid caregivers: 
21362.  (a) “Care custodian” means a person who provides health or social 
services to a dependent adult for compensation, as a profession or occupation.  
The compensation need not be paid by the dependent adult. 
(b)  For the purposes of this section, “health and social services” include, but are 
not limited to, the administration of medicine, medical testing, wound care, 
housekeeping, shopping, cooking, transportation, assistance with hygiene, and 
assistance with finances.164 
The Commission also proposed (1) recasting “dependent adult” as 
someone for whom “[a] court would have appointed a conservator for the 
person. . . if a petition for conservatorship had been filed,”165 (2) clarifying 
that the statute applies “only if the donative instrument was executed 
during the period in which the care custodian provided services to the 
transferor,”166 (3) reducing the burden on caregivers to disprove undue 
influence167 from clear and convincing evidence to a preponderance of the 
evidence, and (4) allowing caregivers to carry this burden solely through 
the testimony of a “disqualified person.”168 
These changes would ameliorate the statute’s fundamental defect—its 
staggering breadth.  In addition, restricting the term “care custodian” to 
paid caregivers would align the text with its animating concerns about 
those “hired to provide in-home care.”169  Yet the proposals also elucidate 
that this area of law does not lend itself to regulation.  Indeed, they raise 
many new questions.  Would the new definition of “care custodian”—an 
individual who caretakes “for compensation, as a profession or 
occupation”—apply to Volovic, who drew a salary but “had never 
previously worked as a caregiver and was arguably not a professional 
 
 164 Cal.  Law  Revision  Comm’n,  supra note 21, at 19. 
 165 Id. at 19–20. 
 166 Id. at 21. 
 167 The  Commission  eliminates  the  statute’s  reference  to  “menace  or  duress,”  correctly  noting  that  
none of the rationales for the presumption justify “terms  of  art  that  describe  extreme  forms  of  coercion.”    
Id. at 5. 
 168 See Minutes of  Meeting,  California  Law  Revision  Comm’n,  April  10,  2008,  at  3,  5, available 
at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/Minutes/Minutes2008-04.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).  Although an 
express preexisting friendship exception could achieve many of these goals, it would also create 
uncertainty  by  requiring  courts  to  define  a  “friend.”  See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, Friendship and the Law, 
54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 638–47 (2007) (proposing a ten-factor  “set  of  criteria  [which]  may  be  useful  in  
delineating the contours of the friendship relation.”);;  Laura  A.  Rosenbury,  Friends With Benefits?, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 189, 205 (2007) (noting that courts refuse to enforce instructions for a trustee to make 
distributions to the settlor’s unidentified “friends”  for  lack  of  an  ascertainable beneficiary). 
 169 CAL. S. B. ANALYSIS., ASSEMB. B. 1172, July 8, 1997 (emphasis added); see also Kirsten M. 
Kwasneski, Comment, The Danger of a Label: How Legal Interpretation  of   “Care  Custodian”  Can  
Frustrate  a  Testator’s  Wish  to  Make  a  Gift  to  a  Personal Friend, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 269, 290 
(2006) (proposing   that   the   Legislature   amend   section   21350   to   “encompasses   only   those   individuals  
who are in the occupation of providing caretaking services.”). 
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caregiver[?]”170  Why exempt C.J. Thompson in Shinkle, whose role as 
ombudsman, for which he earned no “compensation,” gave him access to 
sensitive financial information about elderly patients?171  What does the 
slippery phrase “health services or social services” mean?172  As noted 
above, these terms are so vague that they seem to encompass any manner 
of providing assistance to an elder.  They thus invite arbitrary line-drawing 
regarding the nature and degree of chores; it is now unclear where 
“unsophisticated care and attention”173 ends and full-blown “social 
services” begin.  Moreover, they contain a fundamental perversity—the 
more kindness one displays toward an elder, the more likely it is that one 
will be statutorily disinherited.174  Finally, what is it about the caregiving 
relationship that justifies making caregivers, paid or otherwise, 
“disqualified person[s]”?  I examine this last question in the next section. 
A. Policy Rationales for Retaining the “Care Custodian” Provision 
The Law Revision Commission offers three reasons for retaining the 
“care custodian” provision: (1) caregivers have an opportunity to unduly 
influence their patients; (2)  “dependent adults” are especially vulnerable; 
and (3) devises to caregivers are likely “unnatural.”175  I discuss each in 
turn. 
1. Opportunity to Exert Undue Influence 
The Commission correctly notes that “[t]he intimacy, privacy, and 
duration of a care custodian relationship provides a significant opportunity 
to exert undue influence on a dependent adult.”176  But this may be equally 
true of other relationships that would not fall within the revised statute: an 
elder’s family, close friends, doctors, spiritual advisors, and volunteer 
caregivers.  Moreover, courts routinely announce that the “mere 
opportunity to influence the mind of the testator, even coupled with an 
interest or a motive to do so, is not sufficient” to prove undue influence.177  
Indeed, that is why California courts have demanded “a showing that the 
beneficiary actively participated in the preparation of the will” and actually 
 
 170 In re Estate of Odian, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 399 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 171 See Estate   of   Shinkle,   119  Cal.  Rptr.   2d   42,   54   (Ct.   App.   2002)   (“But   for   the   ombudsman  
program, Thompson would not have met Shinkle, would not have had access to her financial and 
personal information, and would not have gained her trust.”). 
 172 The   Law   Revision   Commission’s   illustrative   list,   see supra note 21, does not answer this 
question.  It includes, but is not limited to “housekeeping,   shopping . . . transportation . . . [and] 
assistance with finances”  (emphasis  added). 
 173 In re Conservatorship of Estate of Davidson, 6 Cal .Rptr. 3d 702, 713 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 174 Justice Corrigan alludes to this point.  See Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1214 n.3 (Cal. 
2006) (Corrigan, J., dissenting)   (“Those   who   provide   only   trivial or undependable care may inherit, 
while those whose care is substantial and ongoing are not only to be denied, but also assessed costs and 
attorney  fees.”). 
 175 See Cal.  Law  Revision  Comm’n,  supra note 21, at 7–8. 
 176 Id. 
 177 In re Welch’s  Estate,  272  P.2d  512,  514  (Cal.  1954). 
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“affect[ed] the contents of the will” to shift the burden to the beneficiary.178  
The “care custodian” provision only presumes that caregivers actively 
participate in the preparation and execution of the will because of a 
historical accident—Section 21350 first governed gifts to drafting 
attorneys, who by definition create the will.  The common law also 
indulged in the sensible inference that lawyers actively participate in their 
client’s will.179  Conversely, there is no inexorable tether between the act of 
caregiving or the role of a caregiver and the contents of an elder’s estate 
plan.  Thus, to the extent the statute assumes that caregivers dictate their 
patients’ testamentary instruments, its basis for doing so is unclear.  To the 
extent it dispenses with this requirement, it ignores a factor that California 
courts have recognized as a telling indication of undue influence. 
2. Vulnerability of “Dependent Adults” 
The Commission explains that “a transferor may be dependent on a 
care custodian for assistance with the necessities of life” and may also 
suffer from debilitating conditions “that could make the transferor more 
vulnerable to pressure and manipulation.”180  The Commission sets the 
statute on firmer ground by changing the definition of “dependent adult” 
from anyone over sixty-four181 to individuals who would require a 
conservator.182 
Nevertheless, evidence of a testator’s impairment does not factor into 
the test for raising the presumption of undue influence.  As such, making it 
a pillar for a novel extension of the presumption is unusual.  Although a 
few cases have mentioned the testator’s susceptibility to bolster their 
conclusion that a beneficiary obtained a gift by undue influence, the 
general rule is that “proof of the testator’s mental weakness does not 
establish more than a conjecture that the will is the result of undue 
influence.”183  California courts have also required a testator to be severely 
incapacitated to lose the right to devise property.  Even being under a 
conservatorship does not suffice.184  Thus, without significantly more, the 
fact that “dependent adults” may be particularly vulnerable to undue 
influence is not a persuasive basis for barring gifts to “care custodians.” 
3. “Undue Profit” to Caregivers 
Finally, and most importantly, the Commission contends that, “[a]n 
estate plan may be considered unnatural if it provides a large gift to a 
person who is not related to the transferor or is remotely related, while 
 
 178 Estate of Swetmann, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457, 466 (Ct. App. 2000) (collecting cases); see also 
Estate of Bould, 287 P.2d 8, 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (collecting cases). 
 179 Estate of Auen, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 557, 562 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 180 Cal.  Law  Revision  Comm’n,  supra note 21,  at 8. 
 181 See supra note 155. 
 182 Cal. Law Revision  Comm’n,  supra  note  21, at 19–20. 
 183 William H. Lindsley et al., Wills, 64 CAL. JUR. 3D § 188 (2007) (collecting cases). 
 184 See Estate of Mann, 229 Cal. Rptr. 225, 230-31 (Ct. App. 1986). 
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providing a less generous gift to close relations.”185  According to the 
Commission, this rationale is a valid basis for distinguishing between paid 
and unpaid caregivers: “While a large gift to a paid employee may appear 
‘unnatural,’ the same gift to a friend or Good Samaritan may not.”186 
Yet the hallmark of the “undue profit” element under California law—
what makes the state’s undue influence doctrine so progressive—is its fact-
intensive flexibility.187  Indeed, the test calls for the judge to place herself 
in the testator’s shoes—to disregard labels and examine the substance of 
each relationship.188  The Law Revision Commission is absolutely correct 
that some testamentary gifts to caregivers “may” seem unnatural, especially 
if they come at the expense of close friends or family.  But this will not 
always be the case.  For example, in Shinkle and Odian, the “care 
custodian” provision invalidated transfers even though the caregivers were 
closer to the testators in their final years than any other person.189  At the 
same time, both cases featured strong countervailing evidence that called 
the caregivers’ motives into question.190  Trial courts and the doctrine of 
undue influence “exist[ ] to resolve”191 questions of whether a testamentary 
gift is “natural” or whether a profit is “due.”  A bright-line rule is a poor fit. 
Moreover, not only is any assumption about “undue profit” troubling, 
but this particular assumption—that all testamentary gifts to paid caregivers 
are “undue”—is hardly convincing.  Caregivers make little money,192 rarely 
have health insurance,193 and perform invaluable and often distasteful tasks.  
Elders “need catheters, oxygen tanks, and wheelchairs.  They need 
someone to put a spoon in their mouths, to get them on the toilet, to pull on 
their socks, and to remind them what day it is.  They need someone to 
oversee an arsenal of medications and a cadre of medical specialists.”194  
Indeed, “[i]ndividuals with three or four chronic illnesses have 8 to 14 
physicians taking care of them.  The complexity for caregivers is a 
tremendous challenge.”195  Especially in states such as California, where 
 
 185 Cal. Law Revision  Comm’n,  supra note 21, at 8. 
 186 Id. 
 187 See supra note 52, at 564. 
 188 See id. 
 189 Estate  of  Shinkle,  119  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  42,  50  (Ct.  App.  2002)  (noting  that  the   testator’s  closest 
relative was a cousin whom she had not seen for four decades); In re Estate of Odian, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
390, 392–93 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 190 See Shinkle, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47–48 (Ct. App. 2002) (noting that Thompson suggested that 
Shinkle make an estate plan and was close behind her during meetings with her lawyer); Odian, 51 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 394 (noting that Volovic apparently isolated Odian and filled out her will for her). 
 191 Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1215 (Cal. 2006) (Corrigan, J., dissenting). 
 192 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 193 See Bob Moos, Who’ll  Care  for  Aging  Boomers?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 4, 2007, at 
1A, available at 2007 WLNR 12671984 (estimating that only half of caregivers have health insurance, 
and  “[i]f  a  caregiver  has  coverage,  it’s  usually  because  of  a  spouse  or  another  job.”). 
 194 Elder Care Challenges and Solutions: Hearing Before the Senate Joint Econ. Comm., 116th 
Cong. (2007) (testimony of Virginia Morris), available at 2007 WLNR 9245900. 
 195 Michael Vitez, National Conference on Aging Delivers Wake-up Call to Boomers, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Mar. 11, 2007, at A4, available at 2007 WLNR 4598239. 
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seniors often have valuable illiquid assets, such as real estate, a senior 
could very well want to reward a caregiver for his or her efforts but be 
unable to do so during life.  Thus, there should be nothing inherently 
suspect about a bequest to a paid caregiver. 
CONCLUSION 
The “care custodian” provision casts a long shadow over California 
probate law.  Currently, its definitions are so broad, and exceptions so 
narrow, that it is doctrinally and theoretically incoherent.  As the law now 
stands, when an unrelated beneficiary helps an elder in any fashion, they do 
so at their own peril.  The California Law Revision Commission’s tentative 
recommendations would circumscribe the statute and thus are a good first 
step.  But before its mandate to rethink the statute expires, the Commission 
should seriously consider whether to abandon the “care custodian” 
provision once and for all. 
